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Why not in your Backyard? On the Location 





In this paper, we tackle the issue of locating a public facility which provides a public good in 
a closed and populated territory. This facility generates differentiated benefits to 
neighborhoods depending on their distance from it. In the case of a Nimby facility, the 
smaller is the distance, the lower is the individual benefit. The opposite is true in the case of 
an anti-Nimby facility. We first characterize the optimal location which would be chosen by a 
social planner. Then we introduce a common-agency lobbying game, where agents attempt to 
influence the location and provision decisions by the government. Some interesting results 
arise in the case where only a subset of neighborhoods lobby. First, the solution of the 
lobbying game can replicate the optimal solution. Second, under-provision and over-provision 
of the public good may be obtained both in the Nimby and the anti-Nimby cases. The 
provision outcome depends on the presence of either a congestion effect or an agglomeration 
effect. Third, some non-lobbying neighborhoods may be better off than in the case where all 
neighborhoods lobby, which raises the possibility of free-riding at the lobbying stage. 
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The location of a public facility in a territory, providing a public good to the inhabitants
of this territory, is a thorny issue. The main reason is that, in most cases, a public facility
has di⁄erentiated e⁄ects on inhabitants, depending on distances. The importance of this
issue can hardly be dismissed. The decision over the siting of such facilities is often a
very complicated endeavor, especially in the case of noxious facilities, such as land￿lls,
incinerators, prisons, etc. Although everybody acknowledges the importance of the public
good, local residents usually oppose the construction of these facilities in their community,
showing an attitude which is referred to as the NIMBY (￿Not In My Backyard￿ ) syndrome.
The choice of the location of these facilities is the object of ￿erce political competition,
which leads to long and laborious decision processes and sometimes siting stalemates.1
In this paper we adopt a political economy perspective to investigate two interrelated
issues: the location of the public facility and its size, measured in terms of the public
goods and services that the facility provides to the citizens.2 We set up a model of one
locality, which we will call ￿city￿ , formed of neighborhoods (households) spread on a
closed circular territory.3 A decision must be taken on the siting and the size of a facility,
when neighborhoods are a⁄ected by both the amount of the provision of the public good
(i.e., the size of the facility) and by the distance to the facility. Abstracting from the
location issue, agents value the public good. We refer to the facility as a Nimby facility
when the relationship between individual bene￿ts and distance is positive, and as an anti-
Nimby facility when the relationship is negative. Thus, for a given amount of public good
provision, the closer to a neighborhood is a facility, the worse it is for this neighborhood
in the Nimby case and the better in the anti-Nimby case.
We ￿rst prove the existence and characterize the optimal solution that would be cho-
sen by the government if it acted as a benevolent social planner. This case serves as a
benchmark in the sequel. Then, building on the menu-auction framework developed by
Bernheim and Whinston [1] and applied by Grossman and Helpman in a series of studies
[7], [8], we turn to the equilibrium of the lobbying game played by the government and
the neighborhoods, using as a benchmark the social planner solution.
1Examples of public processes related to decisions on the siting of such facilities in Canada, the Nether-
lands and Switzerland can be found in Kuhn and Ballard [11], Wolsink [15] and Frey, Oberholzer-Gee and
Eichenberger [5], respectively.
2Given this perspective, we leave aside the issue of optimal taxation policy which could a⁄ect the welfare
consequences of the location of such a facility, by means of subsidies and taxes.
3Our analysis highlights the importance of reasoning on a multi-dimensional space when addressing
location issues.
1First, we show that the lobbying equilibrium replicates the optimal solution not only
when all neighborhoods lobby, but also in cases where only some neighborhoods lobby.
Second, with regard to the relationship between the provision of the public good and the
location of the facility, we prove that, both in the Nimby and the anti-Nimby case, when the
lobbying equilibrium di⁄ers from the social planner solution, there may be either under-
provision or over-provision. To explain this result, we introduce the notions of ￿public
complements￿and ￿public substitutes￿to characterize the relationship between the size
of the facility and the distance. When they are public complements, there is a ￿congestion
e⁄ect￿ such that shorter distance is associated with lower demand of the public good.
When they are public substitutes, there is an ￿agglomeration e⁄ect￿ such that shorter
distance is associated with higher demand of the public good.4
Exploring further the issue of the consequences of the lobbying activities, and turning to
the normative aspects of the political game, we show that, when the equilibrium decision
di⁄ers from the optimal one, some lobbies may be worse o⁄ whereas some non-lobbies
may be better o⁄. This raises the issue of free-riding on lobbying activities. Therefore our
analysis of the political decision of locating a public facility opens new perspectives on the
distributional consequences of this problem.
A recent study by Feinerman et al. [3] is close in spirit to ours, as it focuses on the
political game being played by lobbies about the location of a waste facility. However
it di⁄ers from ours in many ways. First, their model is very di⁄erent from ours, as it
is based on a housing price mechanism in a two-city economy, where the two cities are
situated at the extremities of a segment. The siting of the facility has only indirect e⁄ects
on households￿ utility through the housing price, but does not enter directly in their
utility function: as such, it does not properly match the de￿nition of a Nimby facility,
that is, an overall advantageous good with local harms based on distance. Hence, they
cannot address the link between the location and the supply of the public good. Second,
they are interested in the positive issue of the location of the public good but do not
address the normative implications of this decision. Third, our analysis is more general
as our formalization allows us to study the location and size of a public facility having
di⁄erentiated e⁄ects on an inde￿nite number of inhabitants disseminated in a territory,
be they positive or negative. In other words, our analysis is not restricted to noxious
facilities, nor to a one-dimension spatial economy.
4This e⁄ect is reminiscent of the agglomeration e⁄ect used in economic geography, as it refers to a
positive e⁄ect due to increased density. Here it refers to a public good, and not to the concentration of
production factors.
2Fredriksson [6] studies the political economy implications of di⁄erent institutional
structures on the choice of capacity of hazardous waste facilities in a federal system and
￿nds that a decentralized system yields the ￿rst-best capacity level whereas a centralized
system tends to implement sub-optimal levels. His paper has no spatial content and no
attention whatsoever is paid to the choice of the (optimal) location of the facility, and
to the interaction between (optimal) provision and location, which are instead the main
objectives of our investigation. Furthermore, he does not address the lobbying issue.
The plan of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model of a multi-neighborhood
city facing the issue of the location and size of a public facility. In section 3, we analyze
the optimal solution of this problem made by a social planner. This solution will be used
as a benchmark for the assessment of the political solution. Section 4 is devoted to the
study of the political game when neighborhoods lobby the policymaker in charge of the
city. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
We consider an economy formed of a territory and populated by n equal-sized neighbor-
hoods (n > 1). We call this economy a ￿city￿ . The territory is spatially de￿ned as the area
S of the trigonometric circle.5 The city is composed of ￿neighborhoods￿ . A neighborhood
is a set of identical agents, whose mass is normalized to one and is supposed to be located
on a single point. On a given point, there is one neighborhood. We denote by O the center
of the circle.
According to these assumptions, we introduce the following de￿nition.
De￿nition 1 A n￿ neighborhood structure P is a set of n points fP1;::;Pi;:::;Png such
that x2
i + y2
i ￿ 1 where (xi;yi) 2 R2 are the coordinates of Pi.
Any point Pi is fully characterized by these coordinates or equivalently by its radian.
Without loss of generality, we assume that points are ranked in P in such a way that
radian(Pi) < radian(Pi0); for any i < i
0
: We denote by e P the convex hull de￿ned by the
n points fP1;::;Pi;:::;Png:
A public facility has to be located in the territory S. This facility provides a public
good to agents. There exists a single policymaker who decides both on the (per-capita)
size of the facility, measured in terms of the amount of the public good that provides,
5This assumption is introduced for the sake of simplicity. Our analysis could be generalized to the study
of the location of a public facility when a population is spatially disseminated within a bounded territory.
3g; and its location, L, included in S: The policymaker of the city, in charge of its public
a⁄airs, is called the ￿mayor￿ .6 The location L is fully characterized by its coordinates
(xl;yl): Obviously, the knowledge of these coordinates allows us to obtain the euclidean
distance between L and any point Pi belonging to P. We denote this distance by di:
The construction of the facility is ￿nanced by lump-sum taxes. Assuming that costs
depend linearly on the size and there is no de￿cit spending, we have:
g = ￿ = ￿i;8i: (1)
Each agent is endowed with the same endowment e 2 R+: Each agent appreciates
consuming the private and the public goods. In addition the bene￿ts she draws from the
public good depends on the distance between her own location in the city and the location
of the public facility. Some facilities are such that any agent prefers them to be located as
far as possible from her own location when they produce nuisances: think about land￿lls,
hazardous waste facilities, jails, etc. Others, to the contrary, are most appreciated when
they are close to individuals; the closer they are from agent i; the better it is for her :
schools, museums, (underground) stations, etc., are examples of such facilities. We refer
to the ￿rst ones as ￿Nimby￿facilities and the second ones, by contrast, as ￿anti-Nimby￿
facilities.
Hence, for any agent i belonging to P, we characterize the utility function in these two
cases as follows:
vi (g;di;e) = e ￿ ￿ + H (g) + ￿g￿Kj (di) (2)
with H(g) > 0; H
0
(g) > 0; H
00
(g) < 0 and j = N;A in the Nimby and the anti-Nimby
case respectively. The public good generates decreasing marginal returns per se.7
With regard to the location of the facility and its impact on a given neighborhood, we
will introduce the following assumptions:
Assumption 1: In the case of a ￿Nimby￿facility, ￿ is negative and the KN function
has the following properties:








(di) > 0 (3a)
A Nimby facility generates ￿spatial￿nuisances, that is, a reduction in the distance di
has negative impact on individual utility. According to (3a), the marginal ￿spatial￿harm
6Here what matters is that there is a closed unique political jurisdiction. The territory can also be seen
as a "country" and its policymaker as the "government".
7We assume that K(￿) ensures that the various solutions that we investigate imply positive and ￿nite
provisions of the public good.
4generated by a decrease in distance is decreasing with distance, that is K(di) is convex.
To illustrate the case of a Nimby facility, consider a land￿ll generating unpleasant views
and odors. The farther it is from one￿ s location, the better it is for the agent. Siting this
facility one more mile away is less bene￿cial to the agent when the facility is already far
away from her.
Assumption 2: In the case of an ￿anti-Nimby￿public facility, ￿ is positive and the
KA function has the following properties:








(di) < 0 (3b)
An anti-Nimby facility generates ￿spatial￿bene￿ts, that is, a reduction in the distance
di has positive impact on individual utility. According to (3b), the marginal bene￿t from a
reduction in distance is increasing with distance, that is K(di) is concave. As an example
of an anti-Nimby facility, consider the case of the city hall. Distance is a proxy for the
walking time to the city hall. The longer the walking time, the higher the opportunity cost
it generates; this opportunity cost is marginally increasing with time (tiredness, lost leisure
time, etc.). Remark that the distance variable may capture both transportation costs and
other non-pecuniary in￿ uences of distance on welfare. Here we do not disentangle the two
e⁄ects.
In both cases, we assume that these spatial e⁄ects are linked to the provision of the
public good, that is the size of the facility supplying the public good. More precisely, it
depends both on the values of ￿ and ￿: De￿ning the function ￿(g;di) as follows:
￿(g;di) = ￿g￿Kj (di)
we shall refer to g and di as ￿public complements (public substitutes) for agent i￿when
the cross derivative ￿gdi(g;di) is positive (negative).8 In the case of Nimby facilities (￿
negative), g and di are public complements when ￿ is positive. Then a decrease in distance
induces agent i to demand a decrease in the provision of the public good, as a diminished
distance decreases the marginal bene￿t that agent i draws from the public good. We refer
to this case as the ￿congestion e⁄ect￿ . When ￿ is negative, the opposite e⁄ect is at work:
we refer to this e⁄ect as the ￿agglomeration e⁄ect￿ . A decrease in distance augments the
desirability of the public good for agent i:
In the case of an anti-Nimby facility (￿ positive), the e⁄ects are reversed: g and di are
public complements, that is there is a congestion e⁄ect, when ￿ is negative. There is an
agglomeration e⁄ect when ￿ is positive.
8To the best of our knowledge such terminology has not been used before in public economics. We draw
it from the literature on strategic interactions and supermodular games.
5Typically, we could think of airports as Nimby facilities linked to a positive ￿: Ceteris
paribus, the farther an airport is from residence, the bigger is its desired size (that is the
number of connections they o⁄er to travellers): hence air travel and distance are public
complements. On the other hand, museums could be thought at ￿rst sight as anti-Nimby
facilities with public substitutability between art and distance: the closer they are, the
bigger is their desired size. This may help to explain why usually capitals enjoy the largest
museums and large airports are located faraway from the city center.
In sum, our speci￿cation is fairly general and covers many di⁄erent e⁄ects which are
often related to the location of public facilities.
3 The optimal solution
First we consider the optimal solution to this problem solved by a social planner. This
solution will be used as a benchmark to assess the impact of lobbies on the political process
leading to the location of the public facility. Giving equal weight to all individuals, the
social planner maximizes the average level of welfare. Taking into account equation (2),
it solves the following optimization problem:
max
g; xl; yl
















xl 2 [￿1;1]; yl 2 [￿1;1] (6)
The ￿rst constraint corresponds to the de￿nition of distance, the second one requires that
the optimal solution belongs to S.
Then, we are able to state the following9:
Proposition 1 The social planner solution
(i) There exists an optimal location L￿ = (x￿
l ;y￿
l ).
(ii) If the facility is Nimby, there may be multiple solutions to the social planner prob-
lem. Any optimal location L￿ either belongs to the interior of e P or is on the circumference
of S. If
Pn
i=1 KN (di) is strictly concave in xl and yl; there is a unique solution.
(iii) If the facility is anti-Nimby, there is a unique optimal location, which belongs to
e P .
9We are very indebted to Stephane Rossignol for the proof of this proposition.






the optimal amount of public good g￿ is such that net social marginal bene￿t is zero.
Proof. See appendix A.
The existence of a solution comes from the continuity of welfare function and compact-
ness of the opportunity set, de￿ned in terms of available spatial and physical resources.
When the public facility is Nimby, it is easy to understand that, if the optimal location
is located outside the convex hull e P; it must lie on the circumference of S. Suppose it
is not the case. Then, moving orthogonally the public facility further away toward the
circumference will make all agents better o⁄. The optimal location may not be unique.
Suppose that there are two neighborhoods located at (1;0) and (￿1;0); then the optimal
location, because of the symmetrical characteristics of the problem, is either (0;1) or
(0;￿1).
As the above example makes clear, uniqueness of the optimal location in the Nimby
case depends on the distribution of neighborhoods over the city. In fact, it is easy to
provide examples which generate a unique optimal solution in this case (see Appendix A).
When the public facility is anti-Nimby, it will be located within the convex set e P:
Suppose it is not the case. Then, moving orthogonally toward the convex hull will make
everybody better o⁄, at least until the boundary of the hull is reached. All individuals
agree on the fact that the public facility must be as close as possible from their own
location.
With regard to uniqueness, a priori multiplicity of equilibria may arise as, although the
individual functions Kj(di) are concave in di, they need not be so in (xl;yl): In Appendix
A, we show that, in the case of anti-Nimby facilities, concavity holds also with respect to
(xl;yl), whereas this is not necessarily true in the case of Nimby facilities.
Finally, (iv) extends the Samuelsonian rule for the optimal provision of a public good
when location matters. It highlights that the optimal provision interacts with the optimal
location. This happens because the spatial externalities depend on the amount of public
good supplied to the city￿ s population. To understand this relationship, it is convenient
to refer to 1
n
Pn
i=1 Kj (di); j = A;N, as the average distance impact of the location of the
facility on the neighborhoods. Consider the case of a Nimby facility. If ￿ < 0, the average
distance impact and the public good are public substitutes and consequently the optimal
size g￿ decreases with the average distance impact. The higher the average distance impact
provided by the location, the lesser the provision of the public good. In the case of an
anti-Nimby facility, the relationship between g￿ and the average distance impact is instead
positive, as they are perfect complements. The higher the average distance impact provided
7by the location, the larger the optimal size of public facility. If ￿ > 0, these results are
reversed. In the Nimby case, the higher is the average distance impact, the larger is the
public good provision as a higher distance increases the marginal bene￿ts drawn from the
public good; in the anti-Nimby case, the higher the average distance impact, the smaller
is the public good provision for the opposite reason.
In many cities, we observe that the city hall or the cultural center is located at the
spatial center of the city. In our setting, it corresponds to O: Are there cases where the
public good is located at the center of the circle? To answer this question, we introduce
the two following de￿nitions:
De￿nition 2 A n￿ neighborhood structure is O￿ symmetrical when for any point Pi
where a neighborhood is located, a neighborhood is located at the point Pj de￿ned by:
xj = ￿xi and yj = ￿yi, for i = 1;:::;n:
De￿nition 3 A n￿ neighborhood structure is said to be regular if all neighborhoods belong
to the circumference of S, and the distances between Pi and Pi+1 are equal, for any 1 ￿
i ￿ n; with n + 1 ￿ 1.
Using these de￿nitions, we can state the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Let
Pn
i=1 Kj (di); j = A;N be strictly concave in xl and yl. Then, if the
n￿ neighborhood structure P is O￿ symmetrical or regular (n > 2), the unique optimal
location is located at the center of the territory O.
Proof. See Appendix B.
This proposition is easy to understand. Given the symmetry properties of these two
types of neighborhood structure, as the social planner weighs equally agents, given the
concavity of the function K(￿); she chooses as an optimal location the center O of the city:
each agent will then be located at the same distance to the public facility, be it Nimby or
anti-Nimby.
4 Lobbying on location
We now introduce the possibility that neighborhoods lobby the government for the location
and the size of the public good. We will formalize the lobbying process as a common agency
game ￿ la Bernheim and Whinston [1], where lobbies o⁄er binding contributions to the
government, conditional on the chosen policy.
8Let us denote with L ￿ P the subset of P whose elements (neighborhoods) are lobbing
and with l the cardinal of L : l ￿ n: We refer to L as the ￿lobby set￿ and to L; the
complement of L in P, as the ￿non-lobby set￿ .
The lobbying game on the location and provision of the public good is similar to
Grossman and Helpman￿ s analysis of trade policy. It is a two-stage game.
1. In the ￿rst stage, lobbies commit to a menu of contributions depending on the
policy chosen by the mayor. Given (2), individual contribution schedule by lobby i
is a function of g and di and is denoted by Ci (g;di): It is assumed to be globally
truthful, that is Ci (g;di) = max[0;v (g;di;e) ￿ bi] where bi is a scalar optimally set
by lobby i: Lobbies play non-cooperatively with one another: when choosing bi; each
lobby takes other lobbies￿contributions as given.
2. In the second stage, the mayor decides on the location and the size of the public
facility, taking into account the related contributions that she will receive from the








where W(g;xl;yl) is the social welfare function given in (4), and ￿ 2 [0;1] is the
weight given to the social welfare and is an index of ￿benevolence￿ . When ￿ is
equal to 1, the mayor acts as the social planner and implements the optimal solution
characterized in the previous section; when it is equal to zero, the mayor is fully
opportunistic.
A solution to the lobbying game is a vector (b xl; b yl;b g;b c1:::;b ci;::;b cl); where b ci is the
contribution received from lobby i, associated with (b xl; b yl;b g): We denote by b L = (b xl; b yl) the
location associated with this solution.
Then, we can state the following result on this lobbying game:
Proposition 3 The lobbying game equilibrium
(i) There exists a solution to the lobbying game.
(ii) If the facility is Nimby, there may be multiple solutions to the lobbying game. Any
optimal location b L either belongs to the interior of e P or is on the circumference of S. If
Pn
i=1 KN (di) is strictly concave in xl and yl; there is a unique solution.
9(iii) If the facility is anti-Nimby, there exists a unique solution, which belongs to e P.
(iv) if L = P, the set of optimal locations b L is identical to the set of optimal locations
L￿ and the size b g associated to a particular location is identical to the size g￿ chosen by
the social planner.
(v) b Ci are increasing (decreasing) in b di if the good is (anti-)Nimby good.
Proof. See appendix C.
The existence of a solution is immediate, given the standard features of this economy
and the assumption of truthful contributions.
The second and the third properties of the lobbying solution can be easily understood
by applying the same line of reasoning that we used in the case of the social planner solu-
tion. For example, in the Nimby case, if the public facility were located outside the convex
hull e P but not on the circumference, every agent (lobbies and non-lobbies) would agree
on moving the facility orthogonally to the circumference and the mayor would implement
this move. In this case, there would be no con￿ ict of interests whatsoever between lobbies
and non-lobbies. The uniqueness issue can be understood using the reasoning made for
Proposition 1.
The fourth property of the lobbying solution is a well-known property of this type of
lobbying games: when all neighborhoods lobby, the solution is identical to the optimal
one. In our case, it means that both the location and the size of the public facility are
equal to the ones chosen by the social planner. When all neighborhoods lobby, their actions
nullify each other and the countervailing power of each lobby against all lobbies leaves the
mayor in a position to choose the socially optimal solution. Of course, then there is no
net gain in lobbying. By Propositions 2 and 3, it is immediate that if L = P, and P is O￿
symmetrical or regular, the unique location b L is O and b Ci = b C > 0; 8i. The center of the
city may well be the solution of the lobbying game, whether the public facility is Nimby or
anti-Nimby. In that case, given the symmetric location of all neighborhoods with respect
to O; their contributions to the mayor are equal.
Finally, according to equation (2), neighborhood i￿ s utility depends only on her distance
to the public facility and on the amount of the public good. In the Nimby case, the more
distant is the public facility to agent i, the higher is her level of utility. By truthfulness
assumption, contributions must re￿ ect exactly the relative valuation of two alternatives, so
that agent i must bid more the closer is the facility. The opposite holds for the anti-Nimby
case.
Turning to the case where the lobby set L is smaller than P, and assuming for simplicity
10that
Pn
i=1 Kj (di) is strictly concave and there is a unique optimal solution,10 we can prove
the following:
Proposition 4 Characterization of the equilibrium when L ￿ P
(i) When L ￿ P, it may be the case that b L = L￿.
(ii) When L ￿ P and b L 6= L￿; b g = g￿ if and only if ￿ = 0.
(iii) When L ￿ P and b L 6= L￿; b g > (<)g￿ if and only if ￿ > (<)0.
Proof. See appendix D.
A simple example will provide the intuition for the result stated in (i). Consider an
O￿ symmetrical structure. According to Proposition 2, the optimal location of the game
is O: Suppose that only neighborhoods Pi, with i even, are active lobbies. Then each
lobby faces a symmetrical lobby with respect to O: The lobbying game retains the O￿
symmetry property of the social planner case, and the mayor locates the public facility
in O: It happens that each pair of symmetrical lobbies will have a neutral in￿ uence on
the solution as each lobby will neutralize the action of its counterpart. This proposition
di⁄ers markedly from the standard result obtained by Grossman and Helpman [7] where
the solution when only a subset of agents lobby always di⁄ers from the solution when all
agents lobby.
This result may provide an explanation for the empirical ￿nding by Feinerman et al.
[3]. In their empirical study of the siting of a waste disposal facility in Israel, they found
that the actual choice made by the Israeli authorities almost coincides with the ￿optimal￿
solution that would have been chosen by the social planner. This is likely to be the
consequence of the countervailing in￿ uences of the diverse lobbies involved in the decision
making process.
Result (ii) is immediate given that when ￿ is nil, there is no interaction between
distance and the provision of the public good. Hence there is unanimity in the provision
of the public good.
Result (iii) illustrates the suboptimality of the lobbying solution when only some neigh-
borhoods are able to in￿ uence the government. To understand this property, consider the
simple case of a Nimby facility (￿ < 0) with a single lobbying neighborhood, P1; with
￿ > 0: In this case, we have seen that the public good and distance are public comple-
ments. The lobbying neighborhood, having no countervailing neighborhood, is able to
10In the case of multiple optimal solutions, we would have to use a selection criterion in order to make
comparisons. An obvious criterion would to focus on the optimal solution(s) for which the welfare of the
lobby set is maximized. Our analysis would then proceed.
11induce the mayor to locate the public facility farther from itself, thereby decreasing the
negative spatial externalities su⁄ered by P1: Then, as the distance is increased, P1 is will-
ing to bene￿t from a larger amount of the public good, because her marginal bene￿t from
public good consumption, given by H0(g)+￿￿g￿￿1K (d1); increases with d1, as the facility
is Nimby and K(d1) decreases. This explains why the mayor is induced by an increase in
the contributions of P1 to choose b g larger than the socially optimal g￿: On the contrary if
￿ < 0, that is the public good and distance are public substitutes the marginal bene￿t of
public good consumption decreases when distance is increased. Thus the mayor is induced
by an increase in the contributions of P1 to choose b g smaller than the socially optimal g￿.
In the case of an anti-Nimby facility (￿ > 0), a similar reasoning applies. Again suppose
that P1 is the unique lobbying neighborhood, with ￿ > 0. She wants the public facility
to be located closer to her. But then, as the distance is decreased, the marginal bene￿t
that she draws from the public good increases. Therefore she is willing to redirect some
resources to the public good, and the mayor is induced by her contribution schedule to
increase the amount b g compared to the socially optimal g￿:11
In sum, except in a very special case (additive terms related to size and location in
the utility function), the location of a facility and its size are intimately related. The
two structural features governing this link are the nature of the facility (Nimby or anti-
Nimby) and the existence of a congestion e⁄ect or an agglomeration e⁄ect, or equivalently,
whether the public good and distance are public complements or public substitutes. As a
consequence, under-provision or over-provision of the public good can occur in both types
of facilities.
Turning to the welfare properties of the lobbying solution, we can show that, on this
dimension too, the impact of lobbies di⁄ers markedly from what was obtained by Gross-
man and Helpman [7]. Again, for simplicity, we restrict the analysis to the case where
Pn
i=1 Kj (di) is strictly concave and there is a unique optimal solution. Then we can prove:




















(ii) there may exist some neighborhoods Pi belonging to L such that v
￿




and neighborhoods Pj belonging to L such that v
￿




Proof. See appendix E.
11Notice that these examples can be generalized to the case of a plurality of lobbies.
12This proposition characterizes the welfare properties of the solution when L ￿ P,
and the mayor￿ s decision di⁄ers from the optimal solution. Property (i) states that, taken
collectively, the lobbying neighborhoods bene￿t from this decision (not taking into account
their contributions), at the expense of the non-lobbying neighborhoods: altogether the
lobbying neighborhoods are better-o⁄ with the decision reached when they lobby than
with the solution chosen by the social planner. The reverse is true for the non-lobbying
neighborhoods. This result is consistent with what Grossman and Helpman [7] found.
However it is not true that each single lobby bene￿ts from the mayor￿ s decision, nor that
each non-lobbying neighborhood is harmed by it (Property (ii)). Two simple examples
will help to explain these counter-intuitive results. Assume ￿ = 1 and consider a O￿
symmetrical structure, with n neighborhoods, n being large. The public facility is Nimby.
Suppose that all neighborhoods Pi, i ￿ n
2; are active lobbies and that among the rest
of neighborhoods, there is only one active lobby, Pj; j > n
2: The n
2 ￿rst lobbies have a
common interest to locate the public facility on the down-half of the trigonometric circle
(with negative y): This harms neighborhood Pj as this shortens the distance dj:
Suppose now that there are only two active lobbying neighborhoods, Pi and Pi+2:
Their interests coincide and they act so as to increase the distance di and di+2: But by so
doing, this increases the distance di+1 and that bene￿ts to the in-between non-lobbying
neighborhood Pi+1:
Proposition 5 di⁄ers markedly from the results obtained by Grossman and Helpman.
In their case, the pecuniary externalities generated by any contributing lobby on any other
agent (lobby or not) is always negative: since all goods are consumed by all agents, rising
tari⁄ on one good through the lobbying activity of its producer always harms all other
agents. In contrast, in our framework, considering as an example the case of a Nimby
facility, increasing the distance between one lobbying neighborhood and the location of
the public facility may bene￿t other neighborhoods, provided they are close enough to the
lobby￿ s location. In other words, in opposition to Grossman and Helpman￿ s, here there
may be a congruence in interests among di⁄erent neighbors.
This sheds light on the free riding strategies being played in both settings. In both
models, there is an incentive to defect from the solution without contributions: if no
agent is actively lobbying, any agent has an incentive to be an active lobby. However,
in Grossman and Helpman when other lobbies increase their contributions, any lobby is
induced to increase hers because of the negative externalities, whereas in our case, due
to the possible convergence of some agents￿interests, a lobbying neighborhood may an
incentive in free riding on her close neighbors and decrease her contributions when theirs
13are increased.
5 Conclusion
This paper tackles the issue of the location of a public facility in a territory from a
theoretical point of view, adopting a political economy perspective on the subject. The
issue of the location of a public facility is important because many of these facilities do
have a di⁄erentiated impact on the inhabitants depending on their distance from the
public facility. This impact may be negative (airports are disliked, almost unanimously)
or positive (museums in the vicinity are also almost unanimously appreciated). We call
the former ones ￿Nimby￿facilities, and the latter ones ￿anti-Nimby￿ .
Considering a two-dimensional territory that we call a city, we have characterized the
optimal solution chosen by a social planner, which we take as a benchmark. We have
then analyzed a lobbying equilibrium ￿ la Grossman and Helpman [7], showing that this
equilibrium can replicate the optimal solution not only when all neighborhoods lobby the
￿mayor￿ , but also when only a subset of neighborhoods is actively involved in lobbying
activities. When the mayor￿ s decision di⁄ers from the optimal solution, it may lead to
either over- or under-capacity of the public facility, be it Nimby or anti-Nimby.
The relation between size and location is complex and depends critically on the nature
of the facility and the impact of size over the distance e⁄ect on individual utilities. To
address this issue, we distinguish between the case where the public good and distance are
what we call ￿public complements￿ , and the case where they are ￿public substitutes￿ . The
public good and distance are public complements (public substitutes) when a decrease in
distance decreases (increases) the marginal bene￿ts that individuals enjoy from an increase
in the provision of the public good. In the ￿rst case, we refer to a ￿congestion e⁄ect￿ ,
and in the latter case, to an ￿agglomeration e⁄ect￿ . When the facility is Nimby and some
neighborhoods are organized in lobbies, there is under-provision (over-provision) when the
public good and distance are public substitutes (public complements). These results are
reversed when the facility is anti-Nimby.
Turning to the normative analysis of the political game, whereas as a whole lobbies
gain from the equilibrium game, and non-lobbies lose, it may happen that some lobbies lose
despite their own political involvement and some non-lobbies gain despite their inactivity.
This raises the issue of who should lobby and who should not.
Our analysis rests on some simplifying assumptions, which might be relaxed to shed
light on new issues related to the location decision of a public facility.
14Here the players of our political game are exogenously given. In particular we do
not consider the lobbying decision as such. Some recent papers study the endogenous
decision to lobby, in di⁄erent contexts (see for example Felli and Merlo [4] and Mitra
[12]). In the context of the location of a public good, our analysis shows how crucial
and complex this decision is. Since some lobbies lose and some non-lobbies gain from the
equilibrium solution, the incentives to free ride are both straightforward and hard to solve.
The endogeneity of lobbies in our context is an open and very interesting question.
Similarly we do not address the issue of the selection of the policymaker, the ￿mayor￿ .
In modern days municipalities,12 a political contest takes place at regular dates and the
mayor is elected, through various electoral mechanisms. In other words, a city is the locus
of an active political life and competition which cannot be reduced to the actions of lobbies
towards an a-temporal mayor. Besley and Coate [2] have proved in a citizen-candidate
model of democracy that the electoral process limits drastically the in￿ uence capacity of
lobbies. It would be worth to relate (local) democracy to the location issue of a public
facility and investigate how this issue impinges on the electoral competition and selection
process.
The city we consider is set on a bounded territory and is isolated, with no borders with
other cities. However many (anti-) Nimby facilities have transboundary e⁄ects. This is
particularly relevant with respect to environmental goods (or bads). As such, the decision
by a jurisdiction to locate a public facility somewhere on its territory has spillover e⁄ects
on neighboring jurisdictions. Consider the case of a Nimby facility, serving a city whose
neighborhoods are concentrated in one side of the territory. The decision is likely to be
to locate the facility in the other side of the territory, thus harming the neighboring city.
Addressing the issue of locating local public facilities in a multi-jurisdictions setting is on
the agenda.13
Lastly, a central dimension of the location of a public facility is the issue of its impact
on the location of private production factors. Here we consider that the public good
impacts directly on the neighborhoods￿utilities, but has no productive e⁄ects whatsoever.
Actually public infrastructures have an overwhelming e⁄ect on the decision to locate or
not a ￿rm or a factory in a given jurisdiction. Amenities, that is the set of public facilities
o⁄ered by a jurisdiction to holders of production factors (labor as well as capital), and
the ease of access to them are a major factor in the competition between jurisdictions (see
12At least in well-ordered democratic societies.
13For an investigation on the siting of noxious facilities and polluting ￿rms in a multi jurisdictional
setting see Ingberman [10] and Wellisch [14].
15Ottaviano and Thisse [13] for a ￿rst exploration of this dimension of competition between
communities). The interplay between the public decision of locating a public facility in a
given territory and the private decisions of locating private production factors deserves to
be investigated in a political economy perspective.
We leave these intriguing issues to future research.
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A Proof of Proposition 1
(i) De￿ne z ￿ (g;xl;yl) 2 Z. Given that S is compact and g is ￿nite, Z is a non-empty
subset of the Euclidean space E3: Therefore, W is continuous on Z and according to
Weierstrass theorem, there exists a maximum which is either interior or on the boundary
of Z.
(ii) The case of a Nimby facility.
To prove the possibility of non-uniqueness, consider the following example. Assume
￿ = 1 and consider a 5￿ neighborhood structure P formed of the following points:
(0;0);(1;0);(￿1;0);(0;1);(0;￿1): The KN(￿) function is the logarithmic function. Given
the log function, (0;0) cannot be a solution as the distance between the ￿rst point of
P and this location is nil and the location cost so generated is ￿1: Hence there is an-
other location of S, di⁄erent from O which is an optimal solution. We denote this so-
lution by (x￿
l ;y￿







l ) are also optimal locations for the Nimby good. Hence for
this example, there exist multiple optimal locations.
To prove the second part of (ii), suppose that L￿ does not belong to the interior of e P
nor to the circumference of the circle. Let e L denote the orthogonal projection of L￿ on
e P: Consider the point C￿ located on the circumference of S, and such that its orthogonal
projection on e P is the same point e L. Then, the point C￿ is more distant than L￿ for any
Pi, that is:
k C￿ ￿ Pi k>k L￿ ￿ Pi k; 8i
so that:
W(g￿(L￿);C￿) > W(g￿(L￿);L￿)
17(iii) The case of an anti-Nimby facility.
To prove uniqueness of the optimal location, let us ￿rst prove that ￿(xl;yl;xi;yi) ￿








































Its trace is then equal to:
tr = K00(di) +
K0(di)
di
which is negative given Assumption 2.





[(xl ￿ xi)2 + (yl ￿ yi)2]2
which is positive given Assumption 2.
Hence, ￿(xL;yL;xi;yi) ￿ KA(di) is strictly concave in (xl;yl): Since the sum of concave
functions is concave, this concludes the proof.
Notice that, for the Nimby case, the sign of the trace is indeterminate and the deter-
minant is negative.
To prove the second part of (iii), suppose that L￿ does not belong to e P. Let e L denote
the orthogonal projection of L￿ on e P: Then, the point e L is nearer than L￿ to any Pi, that
is:
k L￿ ￿ Pi k>k e L ￿ Pi k; 8i
so that:
W(g￿(L￿); e L￿) > W(g￿(L￿);L￿)
(iv) Immediate from the ￿rst-order condition.
B Proof of Proposition 2
Given the assumption of uniqueness, the proof reduces to show that the vector (xl;yl) =
(0;0) satis￿es the ￿rst order conditions.
B.1 The O ￿ symmetry case























































and by de￿nition of this structure:
xi = ￿xn




yi = ￿y n




B.2 The n￿ regular case
Without loss of generality, suppose that the point P1 is (1;0):
For any n￿ regular structure, n odd, we get that:
x1 = 1;xj+1 = xn￿j;j = 0;:::;n ￿ 1




yi = 0: (13)
Given the symmetry of a regular structure, by permuting axes, it is therefore true that:
n X
i=1
xi = 0: (14)
Since di = 18i, ￿rst order conditions are satis￿ed. This completes the proof.
C Proof of Proposition 3











19that is, the weight of non lobbies in the social welfare function is equal to ￿ which is smaller
than the weight associated to lobbies, which is equal to one. Then the proof proceeds as
in the proof of Proposition 1 (i).
(ii) As we know from previous analysis, in the Nimby case, the v(￿) functions may not
be concave in xl and yl so that the maximand in (15) may also not be concave in xl and
yl and the maximization problem may have multiple solutions. The second part of (ii)
can be proven exactly as in the proof of Proposition 1. For the third part of (ii), it is
immediate to see that if
Pn
i=1 Kj (di) is concave xl and yl then also (15) is concave in xl
and yl; and the solution to the maximization problem of the mayor is unique.
(iii) Same as (iii) in the proof of Proposition 1.






which is exactly the same problem that is solved by the social planner.
(v) Let (g;L) and (g0;L0) denote two possible vectors of location of the public facility
and allocation of the public good and assume that di > d
0
i: Then, for agent i, v(g;L) > (<)
v(g0;L0) in the Nimby (anti-Nimby) case. By the de￿nition of truthful contributions, agent
i must o⁄er more (less) for L than for L0 if the good is Nimby (anti-Nimby).
D Proof to proposition 4
(i) Let P be O￿symmetrical. (0;0) is the unique solution of the planner￿ s problem. Now
suppose that L = fPj;Pj + ￿g for j = 2;4;:::;n: Then L and L are both O￿symmetrical.
Hence b xl = 0 and b yl = 0 satisfy the ￿rst order conditions for maximization of (15).
(ii) First, consider the case where ￿ = 0: Then the ￿rst-order condition with respect to
g is identical to the one obtained by the social planner. Hence then b g = g￿; for any value
of ￿: This is true both for Nimby and anti-Nimby facilities.


































+ H0(b g) ￿ 1
H00(b g) + ￿(￿ ￿ 1)b g￿￿2￿
h
￿ b DL + b DL
i
(16)
where b DL ￿ 1
L
P
i2L K(di) and b DL ￿ 1
L
P
i2L K(di): As b xl and b yl are chosen optimally,




￿￿b g￿￿1 b DL + H0(b g) ￿ 1
H00(b g) + ￿(￿ ￿ 1)b g￿￿2￿
h
￿ b DL + b DL
i:
By the second order condition for a maximum, the denominator is negative. With regard
to the sign of the numerator, notice that the ￿rst order condition for an interior solution
for b g is:
￿[￿￿b g￿￿1 b DL + H0(b g) ￿ 1] + ￿￿b g￿￿1 b DL + H0(b g) ￿ 1 = 0 (17)
(a) Consider ￿rst ￿ > 0 and ￿ < 0 (Nimby case). Notice that in equilibrium b DL must
be larger than b DL since lobbies have higher weight in the government￿ s objective function.
Thus, it must be:
[￿￿b g￿￿1 b DL + H0(b g) ￿ 1] < 0
otherwise equation (17) could not be satis￿ed. If [￿￿b g￿￿1 b DL + H0(b g) ￿ 1] were positive,
than
h
￿￿b g￿￿1 b DL + H0(b g) ￿ 1
i
could not be negative since b DL > b DL: Thus, in this case,
db g=d￿ < 0 and b g > g￿:
(b) Consider now ￿ < 0 and ￿ < 0 (Nimby case). By the same line of reasoning as
before, it must be true that:
[￿￿b g￿￿1 b DL + H0(b g) ￿ 1] > 0
so that db g=d￿ > 0 and b g < g￿:
(c) In the anti-Nimby case (￿ > 0), the proof is exactly as in the Nimby case. Notice
that in this case b DL < b DL:
E Proof to proposition 5
(i) By de￿nition of d￿
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(ii) Consider a 10-neighborhood O - symmetrical structure with P1 located at 0, P2 and
P3 between 0 and ￿=2 and P4 and P5 between ￿=2 and ￿: Suppose also that the distance
between P2 and P3 is arbitrarily small and that the facility is Nimby. If all neighborhoods
lobby, b L = O. Consider now a di⁄erent structure where P2 does not lobby. Then b L moves
closer to P2 and inevitably to P3: Thus P3 will be worse o⁄ than in the equilibrium with
complete lobbying. Similarly, in the case of an anti-Nimby facility, consider P2 as the only
lobbying neighborhood. Then b L moves closer to P2 and inevitably to P3: Thus P3 will be
better o⁄ than in the equilibrium with complete lobbying.
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